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Abstract. The design and development of a computer simulation model of 
emotion dynamics is described.  The architecture of the model is based on a 
control theory of emotion regulation.  Two levels of control are incorporated in 
the model. The lower level is organized around the use of deep acting and 
surface acting to regulate internal emotional state and display of emotion, and 
the higher level is organized around conservation of regulatory resource. The 
model resolves conflict between multiple goals of meeting emotional display 
standards while avoiding emotional exhaustion. Details of the implementation 
of the model and how it is being evaluated are presented.  
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1   Introduction 
There is an increasing acknowledgement that emotions and emotional experiences can 
be best understood when considered in terms of their dynamic properties [1], [2]. 
Emotions are often treated as short flash-like responses to an event, whereas they can 
unfold across time with intensity of response fluctuating in response to external and 
internal events [2]. These fluctuations depend on the way in which individuals 
appraise events and regulate their response to them. Although computer models have 
been developed that incorporate event appraisals in an attempt to capture such 
dynamics [3], [4], as yet no known computer models have been developed to examine 
whether the temporal dynamics of emotion states can be produced using principles of 
emotion regulation [5]. Emotion regulation is recognized as an effortful process, and 
hence a model of this nature could help expand our understanding of how emotion 
regulation relates to states of depleted psychological well-being, such as emotional 
exhaustion [6]. In this paper we present such a model and describe how it has been 
translated into a computer simulation that can be tested against empirical data from 
human volunteers. However, first we outline the theoretical basis for the model. 
1.1   Control Theory 
Control theory has been proposed as a cognitive architecture to explain a wide variety 
of behavior [7], [8]. A primary principle of control theory is that higher-level abstract 
goals set standards for lower levels of cognition, which in turn set standards for 
actions. Within each level, an input state is monitored and compared against the 
standard. A discrepancy between the two initiates an effector whose actions are aimed 
at changing the input state.  The process continues until the discrepancy is reduced to 
zero. If behavior at a low level is insufficient for the current task, the standard that it 
must meet is adjusted by altering control at the next level up. For example, it has been 
postulated that there may be as many as nine layers of control for a task such as safe 
driving [8]. These layers include: gripping the steering wheel, assessing quality of 
driving, and being a responsible citizen. Each level in the control hierarchy impacts 
on the performance of lower levels of control. Emotion regulation can be viewed as 
WKHDOWHULQJRIRQH¶VHPRWLRQDOVWDWHVWRPHHWWDUJHWLHJRDOVWDWHVRIHPRWLRQDQG
as such can be conceptualized using a control theory framework.  
1.2   Emotion Regulation 
According to the circumplex model of affect [9], feeling states such as emotions can 
be distinguished according to the extent to which they involve the orthogonal 
XQGHUO\LQJ GLPHQVLRQV RI SOHDVXUH DQG DURXVDO )RU WKLV HDUO\ VWDJH LQ WKH PRGHO¶V
development, emotion is considered across just the first dimension; emotion states are 
conceived as varying in intensity of pleasure on a continuum from very positive to 
very negative. While, this limits the diversity of emotions modeled, the regulatory 
architecture of the model is relevant to other emotions too. 
People often regulate their emotions in order to express emotions that meet the 
appropriate emotion display requirement for their situation. When people have to 
display specific emotions as part of their employment it has been termed emotional 
labor [10]. For example, customer service employees are often required to express 
positive emotions to customers regardless of their current emotional state. Emotional 
labor has been conceptualized in terms of control theory [11] because to meet such 
emotional display requirements, employees must assess their own emotional state and 
compare it to a held standard. If there is a discrepancy between the two then 
individuals use emotional regulation strategies to reduce this difference.   
Two of the main processes by which people deliberately regulate their emotions to 
meet display requirements are deep acting and surface acting [12]. Deep acting is the 
process by which the internal emotional state is altered, through means such as 
remembering past emotional experiences (as in method acting), in order to facilitate 
WKH DSSURSULDWH HPRWLRQDO H[SUHVVLRQ ,Q FRQWUDVW VXUIDFH DFWLQJ DIIHFWV D SHUVRQ¶V
display of emotion but not the felt emotion. Continuous emotional regulation, 
particularly surface acting, appears to place a large strain on employees, which can 
result in emotional exhaustion and even burnout [13]. 
There is debate about the extent to which people maintain coherency between 
internal emotional state and expressed display state, with evidence both for [14] and 
against [15@ FRKHUHQF\ ,QRUGHU IRUGHHS DFWLQJ WR LQIOXHQFH WKH PRGHO¶V H[SUHVVHG
state, and thus meet required display rules, a degree of coherency is necessary.  A 
reciprocal influence as indicated by the facial feedback hypothesis [16] suggests that 
displayed emotional expressions can also have an effect on internal emotional states.   
1.3 Regulatory Resources 
A variety of theories have used the concept of resources to account for human 
behavior. Although the theories often refer to different resources (for example, 
individual self efficacy and social support are both seen as resources), they have in 
common the idea that people strive to obtain and conserve resources [13].   
The strength model of regulation argues that all forms of self-regulation, including 
emotion regulation, require conscious effort that drains mental resources [6], [17], 
[18]. The drain on resources, or ego depletion as it is also known, causes diminished 
performance in subsequent regulation attempts. For example, conscious emotion 
regulation, such as the suppression of emotion expression while watching an upsetting 
film, has been demonstrated to temporarily deplete mental resources and reduce 
performance in a physical self-regulation task [18]. Regulatory resource has been 
linked with blood glucose levels. For example, participants who had undergone ego 
depletion were better able to self-regulate after consuming a sugary drink than those 
who had consumed a sweetened, but low sugar, drink [19]. A recent review indicates 
that available mental resource for different types of self-regulation may be a function 
of physical energy within the body [20]. 
Available energy is known to fluctuate throughout the day as a function of 
circadian and ultradian rhythms and time since sleep. The three process model [21] of 
alertness therefore provides a suitable starting point for modelling internal changes in 
resource availability.  In this conception, resource steadily decreases as a function of 
time from last period of sleep and is further affected by circadian and ultradian 
rhythms. Resource is regained during periods of sleep. The aim for this model is to 
demonstrate how emotion states change dynamically as a function of the regulatory 
resource that is available for meeting display requirements.   
2   Design of the Model 
$EULHIRYHUYLHZRIWKHPRGHO¶VVWUXFWXUHDQGVDOLHQWIHDWXUHVLVSUHVHQWHGKHUHDORQJ
with an outline of how it can be used to simulate the dynamics of interaction.  The 
model is intended to provide a general description of behavior rather than a 
specification of actual neural processes. 
2.1   Levels of Control 
The structure of the model builds upon the aforementioned control model of 
emotional labor [11]. However, for the purpose of parsimony, that model has been 
simplified from the proposed four layers of control with ten values to control (in [11]) 
to two layers of control and four values to control (see figure 1). Higher, and more 
abstract levels of control (e.g., to maintain a desired self-concept [11 p.949]) have 
been omitted to create a model of emotional labor and emotional exhaustion based 
solely on the concept of regulatory resource. 
The layers of control are divided so that the lower control loops (emotion control) 
regulate emotion to meet the standard set by the higher loops. In turn the standards set 
by the higher loops are controlled to preserve resource (resource control). The model 
has the potential for higher layers of control to be added (for example to model 
intentions in interpersonal regulation).  However, the potential increase in accuracy of 
the model that comes from adding a layer may not be sufficient to warrant the 
accompanying increase in model complexity. 
 
Fig. 1. Schematic of resource model indicating hierarchy of control. Points of high resource 
consumption are shown (filled circles). 
2.2   Regulation of Emotion 
Each of the two control layers in the model is further divided into two categories: 
internal emotion state and displayed emotion state.  Emotion states are represented as 
numeric values along a single bipolar dimension from negative to positive.  This is in 
keeping with the circumplex model of emotion [9] because it could represent a 
dimension such as unhappy-happy. Differences between different types of emotions 
are not currently addressed. 
The internal states (left-hand side of the model) determine both the intensity of 
regulated emotion that is felt and the target for the intensity of emotion desired. If the 
model has sufficient resource, it will aim to reduce any discrepancy between those 
two values through internal regulation, (deep acting). Internal emotion state receives 
input from sources external to the model, such as the emotional expression that is 
output from a simulation of a second person. 
The displayed states (right-hand side of the model) determine the intensity of 
regulated emotion that is expressed and the standard for the intensity that should be 
expressed. To reduce a discrepancy here, the model can either engage in deep acting 
(which in turn influences the display state) or, if there is insufficient resource for deep 
acting, surface acting. Displayed emotion sends outputs to destinations external to the 
model, such as emotional expression input into a simulation of a second person. 
To address the issue of coherency between internal emotional state and displayed 
emotion state, the model includes two pathways connecting the internal and display 
states. The first pathway, from internal to display, is a necessary path to enable deep 
acting to have a positive effect while also ensuring that the display state somewhat 
reflects the internal state. The second pathway, from display to internal, is a path 
representing facial feedback.  It is necessarily weaker than the first path to prevent 
surface acting having an unduly substantial impact on internal emotions. 
2.3   Regulation of Resources 
$ FHQWUDO UHVRXUFH EDQN JRYHUQV WKH PRGHO¶V FKRLFH RI UHJXODWLRQ PHWKRG 'XULQJ
periods of high resource, the model regulates the internal emotion state and/or the 
display state. At moderate levels, the resource is considered too low for internal 
regulation so it regulates the display state and/or changes the target states at the higher 
level to a more achievable level.  Finally, if resource is too low then target states are 
altered by means of initiating control at the higher level.  
Resource in the model fluctuates throughout the day, is consumed by acts of self-
regulation and is replenished with sleep. As predicted by the strength model [17], 
resource is consumed by regulation so that the model cannot indefinitely undergo 
successful regulation. Higher levels of regulation, such as deep acting, consume more 
resource than a readjustment of a target. Resource consumption is a function of both 
the duration of regulation and the distance from the emotion goal. Readjusting target 
states serves to reduce the initial consumption of resource, creating an emergent goal 
of resource conservation. 
3   Implementing the Model 
3.1   Overview of Model Dynamics  
Within the model, emotional stimuli are represented as impulse disturbances to the 
internal emotional state. Emotional events are additive over time, such that multiple 
events will contribute to a higher emotional state than any single impulse. Working 
opposite this is a continual decay of the internal emotional state so that repeated 
stimuli do not result in a runaway effect - having two cups of tea is not twice as 
pleasurable as one. 
Internal state is affected by emotion regulation as well as emotion stimuli; the 
effect of deep acting regulation is rapid and substantial so that it can overcome both 
the continual decay and stimuli disturbances of the internal emotion state. The 
effectiveness of regulation is determined by the fluctuations in resource availability. 
The display of emotions operates in a similar manner, but disturbances come from 
the internal emotional state rather than external emotion stimuli. Without regulation 
towards a target display state, the display is guided by the internal emotion state. The 
effect of surface acting regulation is also substantial so that it can overcome 
disturbances. 
3.2   Programming Details 
A prototype of the model has been programmed using the Matlab environment, 
Simulink. The resolution of the model enables one data point to be generated per 
simulated minute, resulting in a total of 1440 data points across a modeled day. The 
model can be run over multiple simulated days to examine different effects, such as 
KRZEURNHQVOHHSDIIHFWVWKHPRGHO¶VUHJXODWLRQDELOLW\ 
4   Evaluating the Model 
The model will be tested and refined in a series of planned future studies: 1) The 
PRGHO¶V SODXVLELOLW\ ZLOO EH WHVWHG E\ DOWHULQJ LWV SDUDPHWHUV WR FKHFN LWV EHKDYLRU
under a range of boundary conditions, and the effects of individual differences will be 
examined by changing the modHO¶VSDUDPHWHUVHJWKHJDLQRQLQSXWVDQGRXWSXWV 
 7KH PRGHO¶V EHKDYLRU ZLOO EH WHVWHG DJDLQVW WLPH-series emotion data collected 
from human volunteers, 3) The model will be connected to its clone to simulate how 
WZRSHRSOHDIIHFWHDFKRWKHU¶VHPRtions, and the data will be compared against data 
from human dyads (e.g., married partners), 4) Multiple versions of the model will be 
connected to each other simulate a small social network.  This data will be compared 
against data collected from small group interactions. 
Figure 2 illustrates how the model can be used to compare the behavior generated 
by the simulation against real-time data collected from a human volunteer. The 
volunteer recorded her intensity of state happiness on waking and then on each hour 
XQWLO JRLQJ WR VOHHS7KH PRGHO¶V LQWHUQDO HPRWLRQ VWDWH ZDV UHFRUGHG DW HTXLYDOHQW
points in the simulated days. Resource recovery during sleep was determined by using 
YROXQWHHU¶VZDNHDQGVOHHSWLPHV 
 
 Fig. 2. Example comparison of diary data from a human volunteer (recorded happiness) and 
model data (positive internal state). As diary entries were not recorded between hour 24 and 33 
(bold bar) modeled data for this time period have also been omitted. 
 
,QDGGLWLRQWRH[DPLQLQJKRZZHOOWKHPRGHO¶V behavior fits human data, another 
question to consider when evaluating a simulation model is whether it can generate 
results that are outside of the range of empirical data. If the model can generate results 
well outside this range then matching empirical data is less impressive [22]. A method 
suggested in computational neuroscience research called models-as-animals ensures 
constrained data. Using the model as though it were a human volunteer (figure 2) 
opens up the possibility of replicating reported studies. However, sample size and 
other study design characteristics can affect statistical outcomes reported in studies, 
so replication of the method by which empirical data was collected is essential to 
ensure that simulation models are not incorrectly accepted or rejected [23].   
Models that produce constrained data under circumstances that are representative 
of the research study being replicated provide a solid and compelling base from which 
to start generating predictions for further studies to test. For example, the emotion 
model could be used to examine the likely effects of rigid display requirements or 
altered sleep on emotions without subjecting human volunteers to aversive regimes. 
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